Antibiotics and Animal Agriculture: The need for global collective action by Anomaly, Jonny
 1 
 
Antibiotics and Animal Agriculture  
The Need for Global Collective Action 
 
 
 
Jonathan Anomaly 
In Ethics and Drug Resistance 
edited by Selgelid & Jamrozik, Springer Publishing, 2020 
 
 
 
The use of antibiotics in animal agriculture is steadily increasing, especially in developing 
countries.  The European Union and a handful of developed countries have implemented policies 
to scale back the use of antibiotics, recognizing its role in the global rise of antibiotic resistance.  
But many farmers who raise animals live in poor countries without public health regulations, or 
work for large corporate entities that can move their operations to places with weak regulations.  
To minimize the careless use of antibiotics around the world, we need multi-lateral coordination 
between states on some common standards for the use of antibiotics in animals.  
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Imagine a world in which every time you tied your shoes, you contributed to a process that 
resulted in the unintended suffering and death of thousands of people you’ll never know.1 In this 
world, like ours, shoelaces are useful: they save time, are a little cheaper than using Velcro ties, 
and more convenient than wearing slip-on shoes.  But when everyone ties their shoes, lots of 
people die, and many more suffer. 
This is a strange world to imagine, but it is a lot like the world we live in. The culprit 
isn’t tying shoelaces, of course, but consuming factory farmed meat. Factory farms are wicked 
places – one of the last bastions of legally sanctioned cruelty toward animals. But more than this, 
they are bad for human health. 
Some antibiotics are given to cattle and pigs to marginally speed up their growth. The 
biological mechanisms through which antibiotics promote growth aren’t well understood, but the 
use of antibiotics to promote growth does seem to work.  More importantly, raising animals in 
densely packed conditions requires a steady dose of antibiotics to prevent infections that would 
otherwise run rampant. 
Like many practices, there are benefits as well as costs: meat from factory farms is 
cheaper than meat from farms with free-range animals, often about half the price. This is partly 
because factory farms allow animals to occupy less space, which makes their production 
cheaper, and this savings is passed on to consumers. 
 
1 Parts of the introduction are reprinted from an article that first appeared in Compass, the annual magazine of the 
Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University (2017). 
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Apart from its obvious benefits, factory farming produces many costs (Anomaly, 2015).  
In this essay, I will focus on the threat that our use of antibiotics in animal agriculture poses for 
human health.  Contrary to popular opinion, the problem is not that antibiotics are passed along 
from animals to people who eat them, and that this is bad for our health. Instead, the problem is 
that the more antibiotics we give to livestock, the more we encourage the emergence and spread 
of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in a microbial environment shared by animals and people 
(Marshall and Levy, 2011; Spellberg et al, 2016). 
Like all eukaryotic organisms, people pay a high price for sex: each child only shares half 
of her genes with each parent.  But sexual reproduction seems to confer benefits by increasing 
variation in the immune system children inherit, thus making it more likely that some of them 
will survive the onslaught of parasites that continually evolve novel ways of exploiting their 
hosts (Hamilton et al, 1990). As strange as sex is – each of two independent organisms swapping 
their genes to create a hybrid – the bacterial equivalent is even kinkier than a San Francisco night 
club. Bacteria reproduce by cloning themselves, but they evolve throughout their lives by 
promiscuously swapping genes with other bacteria and by extracting genes from the viruses that 
parasitize them. This allows them to adapt to new environments quickly: in a lethal environment, 
a small number of bacteria are likely to have some advantage over the trillions that die. And this 
advantage comes either from a random genetic mutation, or from the lateral transfer of genes 
from one bacterium to another. 
Some genes allow bacteria to fend off the antibiotics that plants, animals, and other 
bacteria use to destroy them. Many of these naturally occurring antibiotics have existed for 
billions of years, as part of an unending evolutionary arms race between host and parasite. Like 
their naturally occurring cousins, synthetic antibiotics made in a lab usually involve penetrating a 
bacterial cell wall and disrupting DNA synthesis, or otherwise slowing or stopping bacterial 
reproduction. 
All a bacterium needs to survive an antibiotic is some way to either block the penetration 
of the chemical with a thick cell wall, degrade it with enzymes, or pump it out if it penetrates its 
body. Once that happens, it’s off to the races. The lucky bacterium multiplies rapidly and spreads 
its resistance to other bacteria.  When new resistant strains of bacteria emerge in animal 
agriculture, they are passed along to farmers who work with animals, workers who slaughter 
animals, consumers who eat meat, and people in our more general microbial environment 
(Laxminarayan et al, 2016). 
The average person hosts about 40 trillion bacteria at any given time, and we constantly 
swap bacteria with each other and with the environment around us (Sender et al, 2016). So even 
though the overuse of antibiotics tends to affect those closest to the source of resistant bacteria – 
whether animals or people – over time, strains of bacteria that are resistant to antibiotics can 
spread through trade and travel among people, and through soil and streams around factory 
farms.  And while reducing the use of antibiotics does tend to reduce resistance, the decline of 
resistance does not happen immediately, since reservoirs of antibiotic-resistant genes tend to 
persist in bacterial plasmids for a long time (Andersson and Hughes, 2010).  
For more than a decade the European Union has banned antibiotics for growth promotion 
in farm animals, and tried to impose standards that increase animal welfare and reduce the need 
to use antibiotics. The US has begun to follow suit, driven by consumer demand for antibiotic-
free meat, and FDA threats of regulation. But most developing countries are moving in the 
opposite direction, with explosive growth of antibiotic use in both people and animals in China, 
India, Pakistan, Egypt, and many sub-Saharan African countries (Van Boeckel et al, 2015). 
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2. Economic Models 
 
The problem of antibiotic resistance is often framed by well-known economic models like the 
prisoner’s dilemma, the tragedy of the commons, or the provision of public goods.  All three 
models are useful in some contexts, but when they are not adequately qualified they can cast 
shade rather than light on the problem of resistance. 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
 Consider first the prisoner’s dilemma (PD).  In the original example, we are presented 
with two prisoners who are suspected of armed robbery, but a District Attorney (DA) who only 
has enough evidence to prosecute them for the illegal possession of firearms.  The prisoners are 
in separate jail cells, and the DA offers each  of them a deal: if you snitch on your accomplice 
and he stays silent, you’ll get off scot free and he’ll be executed.  If you both stay silent, you’ll 
each get one year in prison.  If you both snitch, you’ll each get a decade in prison.  The payoffs 
are as follows:  
 
         Loki 
 
 
     Odin 
 
 
 
If the accomplices lack friendly feelings for one another, and if neither fears reprisals outside of 
prison, the rational move for each is to snitch, even if the socially optimal move is for both to 
stay silent.  The PD is interesting because each player acting rationally produces an outcome that 
is worse for everyone.   
 The PD is a simple model that is frequently invoked to explain why rational agents act in 
ways that contribute to air pollution or species extinction even when each person would prefer to 
breath clean air or preserve biodiversity.  Although most of the real-world games the PD is used 
to illustrate are complicated by the fact that there are more than two players, that players have 
asymmetric information or poorly formed preferences, and that they face uncertainty about 
whether (or how many times) the game will be repeated, the simplistic two player model is still 
of some use in visualizing problems like antibiotic resistance.   
 Consider the following case.  Each carnivore faces the choice to consume meat from 
factory farmed animals or humanely raised animals free from antibiotics.   
 
 
 
 
 
 Silence Snitch 
Silence 1 year / 1 year    Death / Freedom 
Snitch Freedom / Death   10 years / 10 years 
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             Loki 
 
 
  Odin 
 
 
The payoff matrix indicates that each person does best by consuming factory farmed meat, that 
each does worst by consuming humanely raised meat (if the other does not), but that they both do 
better if they both consume meat from humanely raised rather than factory farmed animals.  In 
the real world, if there were only two consumers and two producers, the effects of Loki’s 
consumption choices would not be big enough to adversely affect Odin’s welfare.  But when we 
generalize to hundreds of millions of people, we get a case in which each person marginally 
increases the probability of antibiotic-resistant bacteria emerging and spreading, but each also 
saves a bit of money by consuming meat from factory farmed animals.  As long as the benefit to 
each from buying factory farmed meat exceeds the costs associated with the alternative, the 
model predicts they will continue their socially suboptimal behavior. 
 There are several limitations of extending a two-person model to a many-person case.  
First, in the large number case we can treat other people’s actions as given, whereas in the small 
number case we might change their behavior by reasoning with them (Bowles and Gintis, 2013).  
Second, in the large number case we may have to resort to using state power to incentivize 
socially optimal behavior, whereas in the small number case people are in a better position to 
create local solutions that exploit social norms and informal punishments to move from the Nash 
equilibrium to the Pareto optimum (Ostrom, 2000).   
Similar considerations apply to farmers choosing whether to raise their animals with or 
without antibiotics, which is a many-person prisoner’s dilemma in which most people reason 
parametrically (taking other’s actions as more-or-less given).  While there is a growing market 
for antibiotic-free meat, so that some farmers find it profitable to reject factory farming, most 
consumers around the world either don’t know enough or care enough about the problem to 
entice farmers to reject antibiotics and raise their animals humanely.   
 
Tragedy of the commons 
 
Many have argued that our aggregate use of antibiotics – in hospital settings and animal 
agriculture – is analogous to the misuse of commonly owned resources.  In the classic example 
of a commons tragedy, farmers lack private property rights and are forced to raise animals on a 
common plot of land.  The farmers internalize the benefits from raising animals and selling their 
meat, but share the costs of grass and soil depletion.  Consequently, in the absence of sufficient 
altruistic restraint, each farmer continues to add animals to the commons up to the point at which 
the personal benefits equal the personal costs.  To the extent that they ignore social costs, farmers 
add animals even if it makes everyone worse off than they would be if they agreed to a set of 
enforceable constraints. 
 Assume, for example, that above some number for each animal added to a common 
pasture, each farmer will get 10 utility points but the community will lose 20 utility points as the 
 Humanely raised Factory farmed 
Humanely raised 2nd / 2nd      4th / 1st 
Factory farmed 1st / 4th     3rd / 3rd  
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grass becomes overgrazed.  If there are 10 farmers, each nets 8 utility points from adding another 
animal (+10 from selling the meat and -2 from depleting grass and soil), and so they add animals 
until the commons is ruined.  The typical solution to commons tragedies is to privatize plots of 
land, or (less efficiently) to set up enforceable limits with penalties for exceeding the limits.  In 
small settings, these standards can be enforced by the court of public opinion, assuming farmers 
care about their reputation in the community.  In large settings, standards are usually set by the 
state, and enforced with penalties for violating laws, or taxes and subsidies that attempt to bring 
about a socially optimal use of common resources.  
 Is the use of antibiotics on factory farms a commons tragedy?  Some suggest that it is 
(Hollis and Maybarduk, 2015).  Others are more cautious, arguing that it depends on 
assumptions that include how quickly alternative antibiotics and vaccines will be developed, and 
how accurately we can diagnose infections (McAdams, 2017a).  Just as there is no such thing as 
a precise carrying capacity for land (since we can develop chemical fertilizers to increase soil 
productivity, or genetically engineer animals to more efficiently turn grass into meat), so too 
there is no specific point at which using more antibiotics necessarily imposes net costs on people. 
 As with the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the commons tragedy model can help us conceptualize 
the incentives that generate the problem of antibiotic resistance.  But it can also be misleading.  
For example, suppose we develop better diagnostics.  Rapid diagnostic tests can make broad-
spectrum antibiotics last longer by helping us identify the specific kind of infection plaguing a 
person or animal so that we can treat it with a narrow-spectrum antibiotic agent (McAdams, 
2017a).  When better diagnostics are available to guide treatment, David McAdams argues that 
“greater antibiotic use can in some cases decrease the selective pressure favoring resistant 
bacteria” (2017a, p. 6).  Better diagnostics may also make it more profitable for companies to 
manufacture and conserve antibiotics if it leads physicians and farmers to more carefully use 
antibiotics to target specific infections (2017b).  Using the wrong antibiotic often fails to treat the 
relevant infection, and it encourages resistance among all bacteria that the antibiotic affects.  
Using broad-spectrum antibiotics without a specific diagnosis is like carpet-bombing an entire 
city in order to kill a few soldiers.  To the extent that we can target our enemies with precision 
strikes, there is less opportunity for collateral damage in the form of resistant strains of bacteria 
that grow in number as their susceptible compatriots are killed.   
 In addition to rapid diagnostic tests, the invention of “adjuvants” (supplements that make 
antibiotics more effective by priming our immune system, or by blocking bacterial resistance) 
can extend the life of antibiotics (Wright, 2016).  Rapid diagnostics and effective adjuvants show 
that the collective consumption of antibiotics does not automatically create a commons tragedy.  
It all depends on how we use antibiotics, and this is in part a function of technology, and the 
incentives that physicians and farmers face as a result of public policies.   
Nevertheless, the careless way in which antibiotics are currently used in animal 
agriculture outside of Europe probably is a commons tragedy.  This is because farmers in most 
countries today simply ignore the social cost of using antibiotics in livestock, and many farmers 
fail to understand how using antibiotics in agriculture can lead to the rise of bacterial infections 
in people that are increasingly expensive, difficult, or impossible to treat.  
 
Public Goods 
 
A final model frequently used to describe problems associated with our use of antibiotics 
requires us to make a distinction.  In economics, private goods are those that are consumed by 
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individuals in ways that don’t involve significant externalities (costs or benefits borne by people 
external to an economic transaction).  For example, when I buy a private good like a cup of 
coffee or a pair of eyeglasses, the costs or benefits imposed on other people are trivial.  Public 
goods, by contrast, are consumed in common, so that we share the benefits of consumption.  
Public goods can be thought of as non-excludable positive externalities (Cowen, 2008), though 
this is misleading in cases where the public good is experienced as a cost rather than a benefit to 
those who consume it.   
 Antibiotics themselves are not public goods, but to some extent the efficacy of antibiotics, 
and efforts made to move us toward the socially optimal use of antibiotics, are public goods.  
Similarly, efforts to eliminate infectious diseases are public goods (Selgelid, 2007), since the 
reduction or eradication of a disease is shared by all people in a region, and potentially all people 
on the planet.  By extension, reducing the reckless use of antibiotics in agriculture is a public 
good.  Although alternative agricultural methods are more expensive, the enormous external 
costs of drug-resistant diseases that emerge from factory farming almost certainly exceed the 
benefits of cheaper meat (O’Neill et al, 2015).2   
 Many people, including some economists, equate public goods problems with commons 
tragedies and prisoner’s dilemmas.  This is a mistake, although it is understandable since many 
commons tragedies and public goods problems can be usefully modeled by the prisoner’s 
dilemma.  But often public goods are better described as assurance games or coordination games 
(Hampton, 1987), and this is good news for lawmakers and farming associations who are aware 
of the problem and want to converge on common standards that allow them to make a profit and 
minimize the risk of antibiotic resistance.  One problem with preserving global public goods like 
the efficacy of antibiotics is that most people are unaware of the problem, since each plays a very 
small role in producing it.  In other words, many people who might help preserve or produce 
public goods are rationally ignorant about the nature of the problem. 
 
3. Moral principles 
 
Ignorance of how the use of antibiotics in agriculture harms human health is rational in the 
economic sense, but it is not necessarily morally excusable (Anomaly, 2015).  Since the problem 
of AMR is difficult to understand, and since each act of consuming factory-farmed products 
contributes only imperceptibly to the problem, it makes perfect sense that consumers would 
ignore the problem and purchase cheap factory-farmed meat, rather than more expensive meat 
from farms that don’t use antibiotics. 
 But the fact that we can explain consumer ignorance does not absolve consumers of 
responsibility for contributing to the problem.  As information about the private benefits and 
social costs of using antibiotics in farm animals becomes more widely available, consumers have 
an increasing responsibility to act on it by changing their purchasing habits and trying to 
persuade governments to make it harder to purchase meat from animals unnecessarily dosed with 
antibiotics.  Alexander Fleming famously warned that “the thoughtless person playing with 
penicillin is morally responsible for the death of the man who finally succumbs to infection with 
 
2 It may be that some use of antibiotics in agriculture is both individually beneficial for animals (who contract 
infections despite humane and prudent farming practices), and socially beneficial for people (who may be less likely 
to contract a bacterial infection an animal has).  But the growing quantity of antibiotics used in farming today is 
likely to produce harms that far exceed these benefits. 
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the penicillin-resistant organism.”3  One form of “playing with penicillin” is the use of it as a 
growth promoter on factory farms, or the more common use of it to prevent infections in the 
cramped and cruel conditions that characterize factory farms.   
A more nuanced version of Fleming’s admonition requires us to distinguish actual harms 
to discrete people from probabilistic harms to actual or potential people.  Another way to put the 
point is to say that the harms of antibiotic resistance are “identity-independent” in the sense that 
the victims of AMR cannot be known ahead of time and, in some cases, are not yet born.  While 
a single farmer (or consumer) misusing antibiotics can create or encourage a resistant strain that 
spreads to other people, generally the prevalence of resistant bacteria in the environment depends 
on how all of us act.  By acting in ways that create genetic pollution in our microbial 
environment, we make it a little more likely that someone will suffer or die of a previously 
treatable infection.  
 Many other pollution problems are structurally similar to antibiotic resistance.  For 
example, each of us drives to work and produces the social costs of pollution and traffic 
congestion as a byproduct, while experiencing the private benefit of an enjoyable ride in our own 
car.  There are also social benefits when each person drives, if driving contributes to a more 
efficient workforce that creates better goods at lower cost.  Suppose the social costs of air 
pollution and traffic congestion exceed the individual benefits of driving.  A common response is 
to impose a price on driving by taxing fuel or charging user fees to encourage the efficient use of 
roads and the atmosphere.  The underlying moral principles are that we should pay in proportion 
to the amount we contribute to the problem, and that if anyone’s liberties to pollute are restricted, 
then all us should face the same restrictions (Gaus, 1999, p. 197). 
 Similar arguments have been made for taxing antibiotics in medicine and agriculture to 
discourage low-value use (Kades, 2005; Anomaly, 2013).  But antibiotic resistance is much more 
complicated than air pollution or traffic congestion: in some cases we may want to subsidize 
rather than tax the use of antibiotics when people who can’t afford them are likely to spread 
infectious diseases to others (Selgelid, 2007).  Apart from taxes and subsidies, there is a vast 
literature on how to harness intellectual property rights, prescription requirements, basic science 
research funding, and shared surveillance to control the problem (O’Neill, 2016).   
What I now want to argue is that without more coordination between states, the problem 
of antibiotic resistance in agriculture will likely get worse, with dire consequences for human 
health in the coming century.   
 
4. Global Coordination 
 
The provision of global public goods like conserving antibiotics and reducing infectious disease 
raises two problems: the free rider problem occurs when individual consumers, farmers, or states 
seek the gains of limited antibiotic use without paying the costs; the assurance problem occurs 
when each is willing to pay the cost of reducing unnecessary use, but lacks the assurance that 
others will abide by policies that constrain our collective use of antibiotics. 
 The first problem is difficult to overcome to the extent that self-interest dominates the 
actions of farmers in a market or of politicians in a government.  But there is some evidence that 
most consumers who understand the problem are willing to pay higher prices for meat from 
animals not given antibiotics (Spellberg et al, 2016).  Moreover, if people really understood the 
problems factory farms create they would likely be willing to pay significantly more for meat, 
 
3  http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm427312.htm 
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since most people support taxes (or costly regulations) when they are reasonably sure the tax will 
be used to discourage the problems associated with pollution (Kallbekken et al, 2011).   
Agricultural producers are also likely to be willing to comply with standards that limit 
antibiotic use provided other firms are also forced to internalize the cost of similar regulations or 
taxes.  The fact that the assurance problem is often more serious than the free rider problem in 
trying to elicit cooperation in many public goods games (Bowles and Gintis, 2013) is good news 
for those who worry about the feasibility of states setting mutually beneficial standards. 
 Part of the problem with antibiotics in agriculture is that as transportation costs decline, 
the market for animal meat becomes increasingly global: animal feed is produced in one country, 
animals are raised in another, and then meat is exported to a third country.  Since producers in 
many countries are now in a position to operate industrial animal farms, unless all states set 
standards that limit antibiotic use, producers will tend to migrate to countries with the weakest 
regulations.  There is already some evidence that this “race to the bottom” is happening as 
Chinese farms are producing meat in factory farms that use more confinement and antibiotics 
than farms in other countries.  In fact, just as the US is beginning to move away from factory 
farming due to consumer demand and threats of regulation by the US Food and Drug 
Administration, many of the most populous developing countries – including China, India, and 
Brazil – are embracing factory farming (O’Neill et al, 2015).   
 A well-designed trade treaty between major exporters and importers of meat should 
recognize the problem of “leakage,” which occurs when one country sets relatively high 
environmental standards, and allows other countries with weaker standards to increase the 
production of similar goods in ways that simply changes where the pollution is emitted (Barrett, 
1999).  In other words, any treaty worth implementing cannot reward free-riding countries whose 
firms are permitted to externalize the costs of their production, while firms in other countries 
internalize the costs of complying with policies that would make everyone better off if countries 
complied with them.   
 A second feature of an effective treaty to limit antibiotics in agriculture is a minimum 
participation clause to assure prospective signatories that unless a sufficient number of nations 
sign on, they will not be forced to pay additional production costs (Barrett, 1999).  This feature 
solves the assurance problem for firms and nations that are willing to comply with stricter 
production practices provided enough others do to produce the global benefits associated with 
restricting antibiotic use.    
A third feature of any multi-lateral agreement to restrict antibiotic use is that it would 
need to be flexible enough to allow countries to achieve collective goals in different ways.  For 
example, some experts advocate setting targets for the per capita quantity of antibiotics that can 
be administered to animals.  According to the British Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, pork 
producers in Denmark (the first country to ban antibiotics as growth promoters) use about 50mg 
of antibiotics per kg of livestock in the country (O’Neill et al, 2015, p. 2).   
A flexible treaty would take something like this number as a benchmark that all countries 
must meet, but it would allow countries to achieve the relevant goal in different ways: by taxing 
antibiotics, placing a cap on total use, restricting antibiotics by requiring veterinary oversight, or 
some combination of these policies.  Antibiotics deemed especially important for human use 
should probably be banned for use in agriculture by all countries.  But what often matters is the 
quantity of antibiotics used, not just the kind.  This is especially true because plasmids that 
confer antibiotic resistance can be transferred between bacteria of different species, and can 
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reduce the efficacy of different drugs than those administered by farmers (Marshall and Levy, 
2011). 
One advantage of imposing “pollution taxes” or user fees on antibiotics in agriculture is 
that, unlike regulations, governments have strong incentives to enforce them.  Governments can 
use the revenue raised from taxes to finance vaccination programs that minimize the need to 
administer antibiotics.  They might also fund basic science research that aims to develop new 
vaccines and diagnostics for infectious diseases, and to develop entirely new treatments like 
genetically engineered bacteriophage viruses (Bikard et al, 2014). 
Taxing socially costly activities like using antibiotics in agriculture also incentivizes 
farmers to find alternative ways to produce meat that minimize antibiotic resistance.  These 
alternatives may include increasing the roaming space animals have, and decreasing the stress 
they face when forced to live in extreme confinement.  A more promising alternative is to create 
“in vitro meat” made in a lab from embryonic stem cells.  This would avoid the need to raise 
animals at all, thus reducing untold amounts of suffering and potential public health problems. 
Finally, any agreement to restrict antibiotic use should be attractive enough for each 
participating country to be willing to enforce it.  It is likely that offering benefits for compliance 
will be more effective than simply threats of sanctions for non-compliance.  For example, it is in 
the interest of all nations that each nation monitors the outbreak and spread of infectious 
diseases, as well as novel patterns of antibiotic resistance.  But sometimes only wealthier states 
have the budgets and technology to accomplish this.  By sharing information and technology 
with developing countries, wealthier countries can both signal goodwill and deliver tangible 
benefits to other countries they wish to comply with stricter controls on antibiotic use.  This may 
act as a positive incentive for poor countries to do their part, even if the threat of sanctions for 
non-compliance with collectively beneficial restrictions is also important. 
 Each nation faces its own challenges, including an electorate that is unlikely to fully 
understand the social benefits and costs of antibiotics, and factory farmers who are unlikely to 
welcome regulations that impose new costs on them.  Governments can justify spending some 
money to ease the transition from factory farming techniques to alternatives that produce better 
consequences for the same reason they can justify compensating taxi cab drivers who were 
required to buy a costly permit from the state to drive a taxi, but who are now forced to compete 
with companies like Uber, whose drivers did not have to pay for the right to operate as a taxi 
service.  In fact, if relatively wealthy governments offer temporary assistance to domestic firms 
to transition away from factory farming, and to relatively poor governments to comply with new 
restrictions, the move away from the reckless use of antibiotics may be easier to induce, and 
more fair from the standpoint of global distributive justice.    
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